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Cairo/Brussels | 7 Aug 2013
Nearly two-and-half years after Hosni Mubarak’s
overthrow, Egypt is embarking on a transition in many ways disturbingly
like the one it just experienced, only with different actors at the
helm and far more fraught and violent.
“The
most likely path today is heightened confrontation amid political
paralysis. It will take a herculean effort to break out of this cycle;
most of all, it will require all parties to go against type and act
against their natural instincts”. Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Senior Middle East Adviser |
In its latest briefing, Marching in Circles: Egypt’s Dangerous Second Transition,
the International Crisis Group examines the current crisis.
Polarisation between supporters and opponents of ousted President
Mohamed Morsi is such that one can only fear more bloodshed; the
military appears convinced it has a popular mandate to turn the page on
Islamist rule; the Muslim Brotherhood, aggrieved by what it sees as the
unlawful overturn of its democratic mandate, seems persuaded it can
recover by holding firm. Urgent, simultaneous measures are needed to end
the violence, reintegrate the Brotherhood in the political arena and
define a more consensual roadmap.
The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:
- Morsi’s administration treated a fragile, emerging political order as if it were long established and electoral results as dispositive in a country where public sentiment is fickle and trust in the ballot box scant. This approach, it thought, would allow it to impose its agenda without need for cross-partisan support. This turned out to be a monumental misreading. But as their opponents revel in the Brothers’ demise, they court the same mistake.
- As a first step, Morsi and other Brotherhood figures detained for political reasons since 3 July should be released. Their continued imprisonment is not only a rallying cry for demonstrators; it also deprives any putative dialogue of key representative interlocutors.
- Politicians and security forces should agree on immediate de-escalation by restricting (not banning) protests; ending politicised arrests and security crackdowns; and curbing incendiary rhetoric.
- If a national dialogue is to have any chance of restoring a more normal climate, it will have to be broadly inclusive and empowered; optimally, it should be facilitated by a credible third party, such as the European Union. The purpose would be to agree both on a process for amending the constitution and on a political pact guaranteeing civilian, majority rule while protecting minority rights.
- Washington and Brussels should seek to make full use of their diplomatic clout to rally regional allies behind what is the international community’s recurrently stated goal: ending the violence on Egypt’s streets and restoring an inclusive political process as soon as possible.
“The temptation to score a decisive victory, yesterday contemplated
by the Islamists, today by their foes, is understandable”, says Yasser El-Shimy, Crisis Group’s Egypt Analyst. “Only this time, the cost of failure could well include political violence at a level not experienced by Egypt since the 1990s”.
“No political actor is powerful or popular enough to unilaterally
dominate the post-2011 system,” says Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s
Senior Middle East Adviser. “The most likely path today is heightened
confrontation amid political paralysis. It will take a herculean effort
to break out of this cycle; most of all, it will require all parties to
go against type and act against their natural instincts”. (ICG)
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OVERVIEW
Nearly two-and-half years after Hosni
Mubarak’s overthrow, Egypt is embarking on a transition in many ways
disturbingly like the one it just experienced – only with different
actors at the helm and far more fraught and violent. Polarisation
between supporters and opponents of ousted President Mohamed Morsi is
such that one can only fear more bloodshed; the military appears
convinced it has a mandate to suppress demonstrators; the Muslim
Brotherhood, aggrieved by what it sees as the unlawful overturn of its
democratic mandate, seems persuaded it can recover by holding firm. A
priority is to lower flames by releasing political prisoners – beginning
with Morsi; respect speech and assembly rights; independently
investigate killings; and for, all sides, avoid violence and
provocation. This could pave the way for what has been missing since
2011: negotiating basic rules first, not rushing through divisive
transition plans. An inclusive reconciliation process – notably of the
Brotherhood and other Islamists – needs more than lip-service. It is a
necessity for which the international community should press.
There are many reasons for the current
crisis: the Morsi administration’s dismissive attitude toward its
critics; its inability to mobilise the machinery of state to address
basic concerns of an impatient citizenry; the opposition’s reliance on
extra-institutional means to reverse unfavourable electoral outcomes;
state institutions’ disruptive foray into partisan politics; and
collective resort to street action to resolve differences. All these
served as backdrop to the 30 June popular uprising and Morsi’s overthrow
by the military three days later and have left prospects for a
successful democratic transition far dimmer than in February 2011.
Social and ideological divisions are more pronounced, violence more
normalised, a seemingly revanchist security apparatus more emboldened
and a winner-takes-all approach more alluring than ever. And all this
takes place in a deteriorating fiscal, social and economic environment.
Duelling legitimacies were on display on 30
June. The first was based on popular outcry against Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood, viewed as incompetent, arrogant, domineering and
increasingly out of touch. The second was rooted in the ballot box. Both
have been superseded in effect by the legitimacy the military bestowed
upon itself as ultimate arbiter of politics. In so doing, the armed
forces unquestionably are relying on deep popular backing among
Brotherhood opponents. But this hardly is a stable formula. Their
support base consists of an eclectic and awkward alliance of liberals,
leftists, businessmen, Mubarak-era conservatives and members of the
establishment. The contradictions will be evident before long; some
already have surfaced. Many Brotherhood critics remain ambivalent about
the role of the army, which simultaneously has turned a sizeable portion
of the Islamist camp into its foe. In short, and unlike 2011 when it
could paint itself as above the fray, the military has sided with one
camp against another.
The fate of the Muslim Brotherhood is at
the centre of the equation. Reeling from its dramatic loss of power and
persecuted in ways unseen since the 1960s, it is reviving its
traditional narratives of victimhood and injustice. It is depicting the
struggle as a battle between defenders and opponents of both democracy
and Islam. It is closing ranks, banking on a war of attrition to expose
the new rulers over time as a more repressive version of Mubarak’s old
regime; exacerbate divisions among their current backers; and discredit
them with domestic and international public opinion. In mirror image,
the new authorities believe that, by preventing a return to normalcy,
the Islamists will continue to lose popular support and – if they refuse
to retreat – justify a more forceful crackdown.
Averting a more violent confrontation and
finding a pathway back to a legitimate political process is a huge
challenge, one that, by the nature of current dynamics, domestic actors
are in no position to meet alone. The European Union (EU) has emerged as
an important potential mediator, a fact that reflects the intense
anti-Americanism that has enveloped both sides of the Egyptian divide.
Others (including, behind the scenes, Washington) should work in unison.
The goal, easier said than done, must be to propose a middle ground
between the Islamists’ insistence that Morsi be reinstated and the
constitution restored, and the resolve of the military and its allies
that there will be no turning back. Some ideas have been floated, such
as allowing Morsi to return with dignity in order to quickly resign,
thereby transferring power to a different interim president or prime
minister acceptable to all; and, through an inclusive process,
establishing new institutional rules (to amend the constitution and
organise new elections).
The current rulers, of course, are strongly
tempted to press forward forcefully in order to establish facts on the
ground: an effective government; economic progress thanks in part to
massive Gulf Arab financial assistance; constitutional revisions; and
elections. But this would come at a very steep price, as the bloody
confrontations on 8 and 27 July readily attest.
Indeed, it is a price the army and the
coalition that supports it should know well, for it is one Morsi and his
allies just paid: by taking advantage of a favourable balance of power
and rushing to create a new political order that essentially
marginalised losers, they put the country’s stability at risk and hope
of a return to normalcy out of reach. Only this time around, the cost of
failure could well include political violence at a level not
experienced by Egypt since the early 1990s. (ICG)
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