1/2: Media Release
Syria’s conflict gives its Kurdish population an opening to rectify
historic wrongs and push for more autonomy, but facing internal
divisions, poor ties with the non-Kurdish opposition and regional
rivalries, its challenge is to articulate clear, unified and achievable
demands.
Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle,
the latest International Crisis Group report, examines the growing
influence of Kurdish factions in Syria while warning against
entanglement in the broader regional battle over Kurdish independence.
“For the foreseeable future, the fate of Syria’s Kurds lies in Syria
and rests on their ability to manage relations with the surrounding
society and an emerging, pluralistic political scene”, says Peter
Harling, Crisis Group’s Syria, Egypt and Lebanon Project Director. “They
express specific fears and general demands, but need to engage broader
society and define a platform to serve as a basis for negotiations”.
Syria’s conflict has given its Kurds an opportunity to escape from a
long period of systemic discrimination. Hoping to avoid a new
battlefront and banking on Arab-Kurdish divisions to further muddy the
picture, the regime largely left Kurds alone. In turn, Syrian Kurdish
factions, many with ties to Kurdish groups based in Turkey or northern
Iraq, took advantage of the regime’s preoccupation. This is the case in
particular of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat,
PYD), the Syrian offshoot of Turkey’s PKK insurgency, whose military
wing has ousted government officials and security forces from many
majority-Kurd areas.
Yet, several factors should give Kurdish leaders pause. Kurdish
factions are deeply divided over goals and tactics, as well as more
petty rivalries. Some accuse the PYD, the largest and most influential
group, of being overly dependent on the PKK. Other Kurdish groups are a
motley collection of smaller parties that, unlike the PYD, lack an
effective military presence within Syria.
Kurdish factions compete not only with each other but also with the
non-Kurdish opposition, whose predominantly Arab nationalist and
Islamist narratives alienate many Kurds. In turn, Kurds have raised
suspicions about their ultimate goals and notably their willingness to
remain part of Syria. The more the conflict drags on, the more ethnic
tensions build. Already, there are turf battles between PYD fighters and
opposition armed groups. Worse clashes may come.
Finally, the Syrian conflict has exacerbated the undeclared fight for
the heart and soul of the Kurdish national movement in the four
countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran) across which it is divided.
Syrian Kurdish parties, like their regional patrons, have different
views on tactics: whether to extract concessions by force or engagement
and compromise.
“By and large, Syria’s Kurds already have made strides in their quest
for greater rights by being masters of their own areas for the first
time in the history of modern Syria”, says Maria Fantappie, Crisis
Group’s Middle East Analyst. “They plan to parlay new freedoms into
constitutional guarantees in the new order that eventually will emerge.
But that will only be possible if their parties and youth groups
coordinate, reach out to broader Syrian society and make their struggle
for Kurdish national rights part of the larger struggle for citizenship
in Syria”.
As Syria’s conflict has expanded, the population in majority-Kurd
areas has remained relatively insulated. Keeping a lower profile, it has
been spared the brunt of regime attacks; over time, security forces
withdrew to concentrate elsewhere. Kurdish groups stepped in to replace
them: to stake out zones of influence, protect their respective areas,
provide essential services and ensure an improved status for the
community in a post-Assad Syria. Big gains could be reaped, yet cannot
be taken for granted. Kurdish aspirations remain at the mercy of
internal feuds, hostility with Arabs (evidenced by recent clashes) and
regional rivalries over the Kurdish question. For Syria’s Kurds,
long-suppressed and denied basic rights, prudence dictates overcoming
internal divisions, clarifying their demands and – even at the cost of
hard compromises – agreement with any successor Syrian power structure
to define and enshrine their rights. And it is time for their
non-Kurdish counterparts to devise a credible strategy to reassure all
Syrians that the new-order vision of the state, minority rights, justice
and accountability is both tolerant and inclusive.
Ethnically and linguistically a distinct group, Syria’s Kurds inhabit
lands close to the Turkish and Iraqi borders, though several cities in
other parts of the country, in particular Damascus and Aleppo, also have
large Kurdish constituencies. Strictly speaking, theirs is not a
region, whether politically – unlike their Iraqi counterparts, they have
not gained autonomy under the Baathist regime – or geographically: even
majority-Kurdish areas in the north east are interspersed with mixed
areas also comprising Sunni Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans and
Yazidis. As things stand, one cannot speak of a contiguous territory.
Moreover, and unlike their brethren in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, they do
not have the benefit of mountains in which to safely organise an armed
insurgency against central rule.
Partly co-opted by the regime, which developed its own Kurdish
clients by tolerating some political and paramilitary activism (as long
as it was directed against Turkey) and criminal activity (mostly
smuggling), Syria’s Kurds also have seethed under systemic
discrimination and repression. Among the more egregious forms of
inequity, some 300,000 of them – roughly 15 per cent of the estimated
two million total – remain stateless, living in a legal vacuum and
deprived of fundamental rights. Although revolts occasionally erupted,
these quickly were crushed. The result has been a largely quiescent
population.
This is changing. As occurred in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003, the
current acute crisis presents Kurds with an opportunity to rectify – or
at least start rectifying – what they consider an historic wrong: the
decision by the French and British Mandatory powers to divide the Near
East in a way that left them as the largest non-state nation in the
region. They appear determined to seize it, though hobbled by competing
visions about how best to do so.
If, when Syrians rose up in 2011, many young Kurds joined in, echoing
calls for the downfall of the regime, traditional Kurdish political
parties took a somewhat different view. They feared fierce reprisal
against their people if they decisively joined the opposition; nursed
resentment at Arab indifference during their own protests – and
subsequent regime crackdown – in 2004; saw more to gain by remaining on
the sidelines; and worried that newly empowered activists would
challenge their role. Meanwhile, hoping to avoid a new battlefront and
banking on Arab-Kurdish divisions to further muddy the picture, the
regime for the most part left Kurds alone. As a result, most Kurdish
parties opted to remain in the shadows of Syria’s broader conflict,
neither fighting nor supporting the regime, while assuming a sceptical
approach toward the (non-Kurdish) opposition, viewed as overly Arab
nationalist and Islamist.
What is currently (and largely as a result of the ongoing conflict)
the most influential of these parties, the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat
(Democratic Union Party, PYD), also has been the most reluctant to
confront the regime, prompting charges of collusion. Well-organised,
trained and armed, it is a Syrian Kurdish offshoot of the PKK (the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party), the main Kurdish rebel group in Turkey.
Shortly after the uprising broke out, the PYD, which had been encamped
with the PKK in northern Iraq’s mountains, returned to Syria, bringing
along a contingent of fighters. In July 2012, it took advantage of the
regime security forces’ partial withdrawal from Kurdish areas to firmly
establish its political and security presence, ousting government
officials from municipal buildings in at least five of its strongholds
and replacing Syrian flags with its own. In so doing, it openly asserted
itself as the authority in charge of state institutions in most
predominantly Kurdish towns.
The PYD’s main competitors are a motley group of small Kurdish
parties, several of which have close ties with Iraqi Kurdish groups.
Under the patronage of Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and head of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP), over a dozen of these parties coalesced in the Kurdistan
National Council (KNC) in October 2011. This alliance has been the only
effective Kurdish political rival to the PYD, even as internal divisions
and the absence of a fighting force inside Syria have reduced its
potential as an effective counterweight. Still, by creating a security
and political vacuum in Kurdish areas, Syria’s conflict has prompted
intensifying competition between these two main trends.
Kurdish factions compete not only with each other but also with
non-Kurdish opposition groups, all of which vie for space as they
struggle to accrue resources and expand their areas of influence. Many
Kurds, especially but not only PYD supporters, are alienated by the
predominantly Arab nationalist and Islamist narratives put forth by the
non-Kurdish opposition, as well as by its perceived dependence on Turkey
and Gulf-based conservative sponsors. As the conflict endures and
threatens to turn into an all-out civil war, sectarian as well as ethnic
tensions are building up; already, the country has witnessed clashes
between PYD fighters and opposition armed groups (often referred to
under the loose and rather deceptive denomination of the Free Syrian
Army, FSA). So far these essentially have been turf battles, but they
could escalate into a broader conflict over the Kurds’ future status.
Finally, the Syrian conflict has exacerbated the undeclared fight for
the heart and soul of the Kurdish national movement in the four
countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran) across which it is divided. The
PYD’s and KNC’s respective regional patrons, the PKK and Barzani’s KDP,
represent the two predominant models of Kurdish nationalism today as
well as two competing paradigms for dealing with Turkey, whose territory
encompasses much of what Kurds see as their historic homeland. The PKK
has used an episodic armed struggle to try to force Ankara to extend
greater cultural and political rights to Kurds in Turkey; in contrast,
the KDP, using its dominance of the Kurdistan Regional Government, has
laboured hard in recent years to develop economic interdependence and
political ties to coax Turkey into a more constructive posture and
simultaneously reduce the KRG’s dependence on Baghdad.
Turkey itself must be added to the mix. How much autonomy the PYD
enjoys vis-à-vis the PKK is a matter of some controversy, though for
Ankara the question has long been settled. In its view, the Syrian
Kurdish movement is little more than a branch or carbon copy of the PKK,
whose attempts to establish a foothold in Syria risk fuelling
separatist sentiment in Turkey. A PYD stronghold at its doorstep,
potentially exploited by the PKK as a springboard in its fight in
Turkey, is something Ankara will not tolerate.
Seeking simultaneously to contain internal rivalries, reassure Ankara
and assert his own dominance, Barzani has tried to broker an agreement
between the PYD and KNC. Both have something to gain: whereas the KNC
enjoys international partners and legitimacy, it increasingly is divided
internally and lacks a genuine presence on the ground; conversely, the
PYD’s strong domestic support is not matched by its international
standing. But this Barzani-brokered marriage, the Supreme Kurdish
Committee (SKC), at best is one of convenience. Neither side trusts the
other; the two maintain (strained) relations with conflicting Syrian
opposition groups; skirmishes have occurred between them in sensitive
areas; and both are biding their time until the situation in the country
clarifies.
Likewise, although for the time being Turkey has opted not to
intervene directly against the PYD – for fear of being sucked into a
quagmire and for lack of a clear casus belli involving the PKK – and
although it has given Barzani a leading role in containing the PYD, this
approach may not last. Over time, Erbil’s and Ankara’s interests are
likely to diverge. Whereas the former aims to consolidate a broad,
Kurdish-dominated area straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border, the latter
almost certainly fears the implications of such an outcome on its own
Kurdish population, and in particular its impact on the PKK’s overall
posture.
Syria’s Kurds should do their best to avoid both over-entanglement in
this broader regional battle and overreach in their quest for greater
autonomy. Their fate at present rests in Syria, and thus it is with
Syrians that they must negotiate their role in the coming order and
ensure, at long last, respect for their basic rights.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the PYD, KNC and representatives of independent youth groups:
01. Improve coordination of political and administrative activity,
and work toward a joint strategy to provide security and basic services
to Kurdish areas.
02. Reach out to broader Syrian society without necessarily entering
into conflict with the regime, including by offering humanitarian aid,
establishing field hospitals for wounded civilians regardless of
ethnicity or political affiliation and expressing solidarity with the
plight of civilians throughout Syria.
03. Refrain from actions stoking fears of Kurdish secessionism, such as replacing national symbols with Kurdish ones.
To the Supreme Kurdish Committee (SKC):
04. Formulate a clear, unified position on what it expects from any
successor power structure regarding respect for Kurdish rights, and
negotiate on that basis with its non-Kurdish Syrian counterparts.
To the PYD and its YPG armed forces:
05. Maintain a low military profile, limiting their role to internal
policing duties in majority-Kurd areas, in coordination and cooperation
with the KNC and independent youth groups.
06. Refrain from any acts of force or intimidation in areas under their control.
07. Refrain from provocative acts that could prompt Turkish military
intervention, for example by using Syrian territory as a staging ground
for PKK-backed Kurdish militancy in Turkey.
To KDP-trained Kurdish fighters operating under KNC control:
08. Enter Syria only based on an explicit agreement with the PYD that
delineates zones of operation, stipulates how disputes between the two
armed groups will be resolved and creates a transparent system for
identifying fighters in each force, their leaderships and activities.
To the non-Kurdish Syrian opposition, including its armed elements:
09. Engage in or support negotiations with the Supreme Kurdish
Committee over what the establishment of a democratic political system
in which citizens enjoy equal rights would entail with respect to the
Kurds.
10. Support publicly prompt repeal of all legislation removing citizenship from or denying it to certain groups of Kurds.
11. Seek coordination with the Supreme Kurdish Committee when operating in and around areas patrolled by Kurdish armed groups.
To the Turkish government:
12. Continue to refrain from direct intervention in Kurdish areas of
Syria, while redoubling efforts to peacefully resolve the Kurdish
question in Turkey.
13. Consider talks with the PYD, possibly under the auspices of the
Supreme Kurdish Committee, aiming in particular at creating a mechanism
for communication and coordination regarding border security.
14. Encourage the non-Kurdish Syrian opposition to bring in Kurdish
opposition groups on the basis of a vision for a democratic political
system in which all citizens enjoy equal rights.
To the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq:
15. Refrain from playing Kurdish factions one against another, and
pursue instead a policy of consolidating unity and bolstering the
representativeness and legitimacy of the Supreme Kurdish Committee.
16. Encourage in particular the KNC and PYD to work together more
closely in bringing peace and stability to majority-Kurd areas of Syria,
in coordination with independent youth groups. (ICG)
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