Cairo/Brussels | 7 Aug 2013
Nearly two-and-half years after Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow, Egypt is embarking on a transition in many ways disturbingly like the one it just experienced, only with different actors at the helm and far more fraught and violent.
most likely path today is heightened confrontation amid political
paralysis. It will take a herculean effort to break out of this cycle;
most of all, it will require all parties to go against type and act
against their natural instincts”.
Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Senior Middle East Adviser
In its latest briefing, Marching in Circles: Egypt’s Dangerous Second Transition, the International Crisis Group examines the current crisis. Polarisation between supporters and opponents of ousted President Mohamed Morsi is such that one can only fear more bloodshed; the military appears convinced it has a popular mandate to turn the page on Islamist rule; the Muslim Brotherhood, aggrieved by what it sees as the unlawful overturn of its democratic mandate, seems persuaded it can recover by holding firm. Urgent, simultaneous measures are needed to end the violence, reintegrate the Brotherhood in the political arena and define a more consensual roadmap.
The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:
- Morsi’s administration treated a fragile, emerging political order as if it were long established and electoral results as dispositive in a country where public sentiment is fickle and trust in the ballot box scant. This approach, it thought, would allow it to impose its agenda without need for cross-partisan support. This turned out to be a monumental misreading. But as their opponents revel in the Brothers’ demise, they court the same mistake.
- As a first step, Morsi and other Brotherhood figures detained for political reasons since 3 July should be released. Their continued imprisonment is not only a rallying cry for demonstrators; it also deprives any putative dialogue of key representative interlocutors.
- Politicians and security forces should agree on immediate de-escalation by restricting (not banning) protests; ending politicised arrests and security crackdowns; and curbing incendiary rhetoric.
- If a national dialogue is to have any chance of restoring a more normal climate, it will have to be broadly inclusive and empowered; optimally, it should be facilitated by a credible third party, such as the European Union. The purpose would be to agree both on a process for amending the constitution and on a political pact guaranteeing civilian, majority rule while protecting minority rights.
- Washington and Brussels should seek to make full use of their diplomatic clout to rally regional allies behind what is the international community’s recurrently stated goal: ending the violence on Egypt’s streets and restoring an inclusive political process as soon as possible.
“The temptation to score a decisive victory, yesterday contemplated by the Islamists, today by their foes, is understandable”, says Yasser El-Shimy, Crisis Group’s Egypt Analyst. “Only this time, the cost of failure could well include political violence at a level not experienced by Egypt since the 1990s”.
“No political actor is powerful or popular enough to unilaterally dominate the post-2011 system,” says Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Senior Middle East Adviser. “The most likely path today is heightened confrontation amid political paralysis. It will take a herculean effort to break out of this cycle; most of all, it will require all parties to go against type and act against their natural instincts”. (ICG)
Nearly two-and-half years after Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow, Egypt is embarking on a transition in many ways disturbingly like the one it just experienced – only with different actors at the helm and far more fraught and violent. Polarisation between supporters and opponents of ousted President Mohamed Morsi is such that one can only fear more bloodshed; the military appears convinced it has a mandate to suppress demonstrators; the Muslim Brotherhood, aggrieved by what it sees as the unlawful overturn of its democratic mandate, seems persuaded it can recover by holding firm. A priority is to lower flames by releasing political prisoners – beginning with Morsi; respect speech and assembly rights; independently investigate killings; and for, all sides, avoid violence and provocation. This could pave the way for what has been missing since 2011: negotiating basic rules first, not rushing through divisive transition plans. An inclusive reconciliation process – notably of the Brotherhood and other Islamists – needs more than lip-service. It is a necessity for which the international community should press.
There are many reasons for the current crisis: the Morsi administration’s dismissive attitude toward its critics; its inability to mobilise the machinery of state to address basic concerns of an impatient citizenry; the opposition’s reliance on extra-institutional means to reverse unfavourable electoral outcomes; state institutions’ disruptive foray into partisan politics; and collective resort to street action to resolve differences. All these served as backdrop to the 30 June popular uprising and Morsi’s overthrow by the military three days later and have left prospects for a successful democratic transition far dimmer than in February 2011. Social and ideological divisions are more pronounced, violence more normalised, a seemingly revanchist security apparatus more emboldened and a winner-takes-all approach more alluring than ever. And all this takes place in a deteriorating fiscal, social and economic environment.
Duelling legitimacies were on display on 30 June. The first was based on popular outcry against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, viewed as incompetent, arrogant, domineering and increasingly out of touch. The second was rooted in the ballot box. Both have been superseded in effect by the legitimacy the military bestowed upon itself as ultimate arbiter of politics. In so doing, the armed forces unquestionably are relying on deep popular backing among Brotherhood opponents. But this hardly is a stable formula. Their support base consists of an eclectic and awkward alliance of liberals, leftists, businessmen, Mubarak-era conservatives and members of the establishment. The contradictions will be evident before long; some already have surfaced. Many Brotherhood critics remain ambivalent about the role of the army, which simultaneously has turned a sizeable portion of the Islamist camp into its foe. In short, and unlike 2011 when it could paint itself as above the fray, the military has sided with one camp against another.
The fate of the Muslim Brotherhood is at the centre of the equation. Reeling from its dramatic loss of power and persecuted in ways unseen since the 1960s, it is reviving its traditional narratives of victimhood and injustice. It is depicting the struggle as a battle between defenders and opponents of both democracy and Islam. It is closing ranks, banking on a war of attrition to expose the new rulers over time as a more repressive version of Mubarak’s old regime; exacerbate divisions among their current backers; and discredit them with domestic and international public opinion. In mirror image, the new authorities believe that, by preventing a return to normalcy, the Islamists will continue to lose popular support and – if they refuse to retreat – justify a more forceful crackdown.
Averting a more violent confrontation and finding a pathway back to a legitimate political process is a huge challenge, one that, by the nature of current dynamics, domestic actors are in no position to meet alone. The European Union (EU) has emerged as an important potential mediator, a fact that reflects the intense anti-Americanism that has enveloped both sides of the Egyptian divide. Others (including, behind the scenes, Washington) should work in unison. The goal, easier said than done, must be to propose a middle ground between the Islamists’ insistence that Morsi be reinstated and the constitution restored, and the resolve of the military and its allies that there will be no turning back. Some ideas have been floated, such as allowing Morsi to return with dignity in order to quickly resign, thereby transferring power to a different interim president or prime minister acceptable to all; and, through an inclusive process, establishing new institutional rules (to amend the constitution and organise new elections).
The current rulers, of course, are strongly tempted to press forward forcefully in order to establish facts on the ground: an effective government; economic progress thanks in part to massive Gulf Arab financial assistance; constitutional revisions; and elections. But this would come at a very steep price, as the bloody confrontations on 8 and 27 July readily attest.
Indeed, it is a price the army and the coalition that supports it should know well, for it is one Morsi and his allies just paid: by taking advantage of a favourable balance of power and rushing to create a new political order that essentially marginalised losers, they put the country’s stability at risk and hope of a return to normalcy out of reach. Only this time around, the cost of failure could well include political violence at a level not experienced by Egypt since the early 1990s. (ICG)
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