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To the Yemeni Government:
To all Signatories and Supporters of the GCC Initiative and the Implementation Mechanism:
To President Hadi:
To the General People’s Congress Party (GPC):
To President Saleh and his family:
To the Government of Yemen:
To international actors supportive of the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanisms (including the UN Special Envoy, Security Council, EU, GCC, IMF, and World Bank, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and Japan):
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Flawed as it is, Yemen’s political settlement avoided a potentially
devastating civil war and secured President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s
resignation, but now the challenge is to address longstanding political
and economic grievances.
Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition,
a new report from the International Crisis Group, proposes ways for the
government to win back society’s confidence, tackle political
infighting and distance itself from the leadership and practices of the
past. It warns that the democratic transition remains messy and
incomplete and that any failure to address the challenges soon will
weigh heavily on an already divided and increasingly impoverished
society.
“Theoretically, the settlement offers an opportunity to include
marginalised groups, reform institutions and address longstanding
conflicts through dialogue”, says April Longley Alley, Crisis Group
Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula. “That said, the nation so far
essentially has witnessed a political game of musical chairs, with one
faction of the elite swapping places with the other but remaining at
loggerheads. As politicians squabble in Sanaa, urgent national problems
await”.
The political transition, sparked by protests more than eighteen
months ago, cracked the regime’s foundations, while making it possible
to imagine new rules of the game. Still, much remains in doubt, notably
the scope and direction of change. Key parts of society – the Huthis in
the North, the southern Hiraak and some independent youth groups – feel
left out. Al-Qaeda and other militants are thriving in a security
vacuum, with the army divided and tribal militias still operating in
urban areas.
A successful transition requires significant steps from various parties, including:
- In order to improve the security situation, the government needs to restructure the military-security apparatus, while the army should respect the orders of President Hadi and the defence minister; moreover, all forces should return to barracks, as stipulated by the settlement.
- In order to improve the political situation, the government should distance itself from Saleh and other divisive elite figures who threw their weight behind the uprising; these individuals, for their part, ought to respect the new president’s authority and step away from the public limelight. The government also should rigorously enforce existing laws, including the civil service law.
- In order to build confidence with marginalised groups, the government should immediately take steps to secure the meaningful participation in the forthcoming national dialogue of the Huthis, the Hiraak and independent youth. These could include, inter alia, apologising for injustices committed against the Huthis and the Hiraak, increasing humanitarian aid to displaced people, releasing all political prisoners and beginning to address issues of transitional justice.
International actors need to ensure that the UN continues to lead
efforts to support the national dialogue. They must talk to all parties
and openly criticise any individual or group that fails to respect their
commitments.
“The transition remains on shaky ground”, says Robert Malley, Crisis
Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “The only way
forward is through national dialogue. But if it is not inclusive or
fails to address the political challenges, violence is likely to
intensify. The result would be more instability and a deepened
humanitarian crisis”.
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As messy as it has been and unfinished as it remains,
Yemen’s transition accomplished two critical goals: avoiding a
potentially devastating civil war and securing the resignation of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled the impoverished country for
over three decades. It also cracked the regime’s foundations, while
making it possible to imagine new rules of the game. Still, much remains
in doubt, notably the scope and direction of change. The nation
essentially has witnessed a political game of musical chairs, one elite
faction swapping places with the other but remaining at loggerheads.
Important constituencies – northern Huthi, southern Hiraak, some
independent youth movements – feel excluded and view the transition
agreement with scepticism, if not distain. Al-Qaeda and other militants
are taking advantage of a security vacuum. Socio-economic needs remain
unmet. The new government must rapidly show tangible progress (security,
economic, political) to contain centrifugal forces pulling Yemen apart,
while reaching out to stakeholders and preparing the political
environment for inclusive national dialogue.
On 23 November 2011, following eleven
months of popular protest, Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) initiative and an accompanying set of implementation mechanisms.
Boiled down to its essentials, the GCC initiative provided the former
president domestic immunity from prosecution in return for his stepping
down. The UN-backed implementation document added flesh to the bones,
providing valuable details on the mechanics and timetable of the
transition roadmap.
The agreement outlined a two-phase
process. In the first, Saleh delegated powers to his vice president,
Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi. Feuding politicians then formed an
opposition-led national consensus government with cabinet portfolios
split equally between the former ruling party, the General People’s
Congress (GPC), and the opposition bloc, the Joint Meeting Parties
(JMP). The president established a military committee tasked with
reducing tensions and divisions within the armed forces, which had split
between pro- and anti-Saleh factions during the uprising. Phase one
ended with early presidential elections, on 21 February 2012, in which
Hadi was the uncontested, consensus candidate.
In phase two, Hadi and the government
are given two years to, among other things, restructure the
military-security apparatus, address issues of transitional justice and
launch an inclusive National Dialogue Conference with the goal of
revising the constitution before new elections in February 2014. It is a
laudatory program, but also plainly an ambitious one. Already the
scorecard is mixed, as implementation has fallen short.
Indeed, although much has changed, a considerable amount
remains the same. Begin with the most important: the settlement failed
to resolve the highly personalised conflict between Saleh and his family
on the one hand, and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, as well as, the
powerful al-Ahmar family, on the other. As both camps seek to protect
their interests and undermine their rivals, the contours of their
struggle have changed but not its fundamental nature or the identity of
its protagonists. Likewise, the underlying political economy of
corruption has remained virtually untouched. The same families retain
control of most of the country’s resources while relying on patronage
networks and dominating decision-making in the government, military and
political parties.
For frustrated independent activists, the struggle at the top
amounts to little more than a political see-saw between two camps that
have dominated the country for some 33 years, a reshuffling of the
political deck that has, at the party level, hurt the GPC and helped the
JMP. This has serious policy implications. As politicians squabble in
Sanaa, urgent national problems await. Humanitarian conditions have
worsened dramatically since the uprising, with hunger and malnutrition
levels growing at an alarming rate. A year of political turmoil has
resulted in severe shortages of basic commodities; aggravated already
high poverty and unemployment rates; and brought economic activity to a
virtual halt.
The army is still divided, with warring commanders escaping the president’s full authority. Armed factions and tribal
groups loyal to Saleh, Ali Mohsen or the Al-Ahmars remain in the
capital; elsewhere the situation is far worse. The government’s writ
over the periphery, already tenuous before the uprising, has contracted
sharply since. In the North, the Huthis have vastly expanded their
territorial control. In the South, the government must contend with
challenges from the Hiraak and its affiliated armed groups. Most
worrisome is the spread of Ansar Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law), a
murky mix of al-Qaeda militants and young local recruits, many of whom
appear motivated by economic rewards more than by ideological
conviction. The government, fighting alongside local popular committees,
has recaptured territories in the South, but the battle with al-Qaeda
is far from over.
Yet, despite these multiple crises,
partisan politics and jockeying for the most part persists in the
capital. Encumbered by infighting and lacking capacity, the new
government has yet to articulate or put forward a political and economic
vision for the transitional period. What is more, it has done too
little to bring in long-marginalised groups and is sticking to a largely
Sanaa-centric approach. Reformers are concerned that vested interests
in both the GPC and JMP are seeking to maintain a highly centralised,
corrupt state that favours northern tribal and Islamist leaders, thus
further deepening the divide with the rest of the country.
Securing Saleh’s peaceful exit from
the presidency was hard enough; implementing the remainder of the
agreement will be harder still. Neutralising potential spoilers –
competing elites associated with the old regime as well as the divided
military/security apparatus – is a priority. This cannot be done too
abruptly or in a way that privileges one side over the other, lest it
trigger violent resistance from the losing side. Instead, Hadi should
gradually remove or rotate powerful commanders in a politically
even-handed fashion and end their control over individual army units,
while forcing them to demonstrate respect for the military chain of
command under the president and defence minister. In like manner, the
influence of powerful political parties and interest groups should be
diluted in a way that ensures no single one finds itself in a position
to dominate the transitional process. Equally important, the national
dialogue needs to be broadly inclusive, requiring immediate
confidence-building measures and continued outreach efforts toward
sidelined groups: the youth, the Huthis and the Hiraak.
Implementation also is suffering from
its overall opaqueness. No one – not the government, parliament, or
military committee – has publicly kept score so as to shed light on who
is violating the agreement and how. Nor has Hadi formed the
interpretation committee, even though it is mandated by the agreement,
and even though it could usefully settle disputes over the meaning of
the initiative and its implementation mechanisms.
The political settlement has numerous flaws. It was an elite
compromise that excluded many original protesters as well as
marginalised constituencies. It failed to adequately address issues of
justice, and it kept in power leaders and parties at least partially
responsible for the country’s woes. But, at a minimum, it offers the
chance for a different future. If politicians in Sanaa fail to resolve,
or at least contain, the ongoing elite confrontation and move forward
with an inclusive dialogue, the country risks experiencing further
violence and fragmentation. Yemen has long run away from critical
decisions. It should run no more.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Yemeni Armed Forces:
01. Respect and fully implement President Hadi’s and the defence minister’s orders, notably regarding military rotations, retirements and appointments, and return all military forces to their barracks as specified by the agreement and by the military committee, unless ordered otherwise by the defence minister.
01. Respect and fully implement President Hadi’s and the defence minister’s orders, notably regarding military rotations, retirements and appointments, and return all military forces to their barracks as specified by the agreement and by the military committee, unless ordered otherwise by the defence minister.
To Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the al-Ahmar family and allies in Islah:
02. Remove all militias from urban areas as well as troops from areas surrounding protest squares as mandated by the initiative and by order of the military council.
02. Remove all militias from urban areas as well as troops from areas surrounding protest squares as mandated by the initiative and by order of the military council.
In order to improve the political situation
To the Yemeni Government:
03. Ensure that existing laws, especially the civil service law, are rigorously implemented during the transitional period.
04. Maintain distance during the transitional period from divisive political figures such as former President Saleh, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Hamid al-Ahmar.
To all Signatories and Supporters of the GCC Initiative and the Implementation Mechanism:
05. Implement the agreement
and notably the national dialogue without preconditions and halt
inflammatory press statements targeting political adversaries.
To President Hadi:
06. Establish and empower immediately the interpretation committee as mandated by the agreement.
07. Avoid to the extent possible regionally-based appointments
and communicate transparently with relevant stakeholders and the public
on issues pertaining to major civilian and military rotations, forced
retirements and appointments.
To the General People’s Congress Party (GPC):
08. Renovate the party, notably by
a) organising internal elections for a new leadership; andb) reaching out to youth activists and empowering them within its decision-making apparatus.
To the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP):
09. Minimise the role of divisive figures such as Hamid al-Ahmar and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar during the transitional period.
10. In the case of Islah,
hold internal elections to renew party leadership, allow new voices to
be heard and intensify outreach to other coalition members to ensure
broad and adequate consultation on decisions related to the transitional
process and notably the national dialogue.
To President Saleh and his family:
11. Respect and honour Hadi’s orders and presidential authority fully.
12. Allow GPC internal reform by encouraging Hadi to head the party and acquiescing in Saleh moving to an advisory role.
13. Support the spirit of the
initiative by disengaging from politics and assuming a less prominent
role during the transitional period.
To Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Hamid al-Ahmar:
14. Support the spirit of the
initiative and encourage reconciliation by playing a less prominent
role in the transitional period and, in the case of Ali Mohsen, reaffirming unconditional commitment to retire from the military by doing so when Hadi sees fit.
In order to ensure inclusion of marginalised groups
To the Government of Yemen:
15. Carry out
confidence-building measures immediately to ensure meaningful
participation in the national dialogue of independent youth groups,
Huthis and the Hiraak, possibly to include, inter alia:
a) publicly apologising for injustices committed against the Huthis and the Hiraak;b) releasing all political prisoners;c) increasing humanitarian assistance and access to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North and in the Abyan and Aden governorates;d) establishing and empowering a land dispute committee and/or employment committee in the South to investigate and mediate longstanding grievances; ande) addressing issues of transitional justice and national reconciliation by investigating acts of violence related to the 2011 uprising and compensating victims, while assuring citizens that these issues will be further debated and discussed during the national dialogue.
To non-signatories who reject the initiative including some independent youth groups,
the Huthis and the Hiraak:
the Huthis and the Hiraak:
16. Participate in the
preparatory stage of the national dialogue by communicating with and
eventually taking part in relevant government-established committees.
17. Refrain from placing
preconditions on the national dialogue and instead present realistic
requests aimed at improving the political environment;
In order to maximise international support for Yemen’s transition
To international actors supportive of the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanisms (including the UN Special Envoy, Security Council, EU, GCC, IMF, and World Bank, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and Japan):
18. Continue to support
the Yemeni government’s efforts to implement the agreement with
technical, diplomatic and financial assistance and ensure the UN
maintains a leading role in facilitating national dialogue.
19. Avoid the reality or appearance of taking sides in local political disputes, notably by:
a) expressing willingness to talk to all parties;b) identifying and criticising openly any signatory that fails to honour the agreement; andc) promoting local oversight of implementation by pressing for establishment of the interpretation committee and encouraging civil society and youth organisations to assume an oversight role.
To the Government of Iran:
20. Support the UN-sponsored national dialogue to resolve longstanding political challenges in Sadaa and the South and encourage the Huthis and the Hiraak to participate.(ICG)
Read full report from here>>>
Read full report from here>>>
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