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The announcement that the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed
Morsi won Egypt’s presidential election has been widely hailed as a
turning point in the country’s history. The international media has
described Morsi as, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, Egypt’s “first freely elected president.”
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Egypt’s own press was even more euphoric, with the daily Al-Shorouk carrying the banner headline, “Morsi president on orders from the people: The revolution reaches the presidential palace.”
These
claims turn reality on its head. Egypt’s workers, students and
oppressed masses cannot afford to lend the slightest credence to such
fabrications.
It is now nearly 17 months since mass
demonstrations and, above all, a widening wave of mass strikes forced
out Egypt’s US-backed dictator Hosni Mubarak. This eruption of
revolutionary struggle was a high point of the response of the
international working class to the assault on its jobs, living standards
and basic rights carried out in the wake of the worldwide financial
meltdown of September 2008.
Egyptian workers rose up seeking an
end to conditions of poverty, exploitation, social inequality and
political repression. They fought heroically against the Mubarak
regime’s security forces and thugs—armed and backed by US
imperialism—sacrificing some 1,000 martyrs in the course of the struggle
that culminated in Mubarak’s ouster on February 11, 2011.
Nearly
a year-and-a-half later, however, none of the demands of Egyptian
workers for improved living standards, jobs, social equality and
democracy have been met. Instead, the repressive capitalist state
apparatus and the domination of the country by imperialism remain
intact, minus the odious figure of Mubarak himself, who was recently
transferred from Tora Prison to a Cairo hospital.
The
installation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Morsi in the presidential
palace does not change this reality. It is the end result not of a “free
and fair” election, but a vote that was held under conditions of
military rule and boycotted by half the registered voters, followed by a
sordid backroom deal between the right-wing Islamist party and the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) military junta.
In the
midst of the run-off between Morsi and his opponent, the former Air
Force commander and Mubarak’s last prime minister, Ahmed Shafik, the
SCAF carried out a political coup, disbanding the Islamist-dominated
parliament, arrogating to itself control over the writing of a new
constitution, and clearing the way for a new round of repression and
torture by decreeing the right of the military and state intelligence
agencies to arrest civilians. It issued a further constitutional
“addendum” assuming all legislative and budgetary powers of the
disbanded parliament and formally establishing the complete autonomy of
the armed forces from civilian control.
The decision to call the
election for Morsi, rather than Shafik, one of the military’s own,
followed intense negotiations between the military command and the
Brotherhood that continued through the weekend. The precise terms
arrived at in the course of these talks, held behind the backs of the
Egyptian people, will become clearer in the days and weeks to come. One
thing is certain: any deal worked out between the Brotherhood and the
SCAF can only produce a counterrevolutionary government whose main aim
will be the smashing of the revolutionary struggles of the working
class.
That this is recognized within ruling circles in both
Egypt and the imperialist centers was made clear as the Egyptian stock
market registered its biggest one-day rise on record in the wake of the
election announcement. The Wall Street Journal reported that US
diplomats, who held “private talks” with the Brotherhood’s leadership
and its economic team, said the organization’s “representatives have
reassured the US by saying ‘all the right things on the economic side.’”
One
of the immediate aims of the SCAF-Brotherhood regime is reaching an
agreement with the International Monetary Fund on an emergency $3.2
billion loan. This will be tied to the implementation of so-called
economic “reforms,” i.e., drastic austerity measures that will further
degrade the conditions of life for the working class in a country where
40 percent of the population subsists on $2 or less a day.
It is
vital that Egyptian workers and youth draw a balance sheet of the past
year and a half and examine the political forces and programs that
brought them from heroic strikes and mass struggles to the installation
of the counterrevolutionary SCAF-Muslim Brotherhood regime. In
particular, the closest examination is warranted of the role of the
pseudo-left organizations, which despite calling themselves
“revolutionary” and even “socialist,” represent not the strivings of the
working class to put an end to capitalism, but those of more affluent
sections of the middle class to carve out a greater role for themselves
within the existing social and political setup.
Typifying this
layer is the misnamed group Revolutionary Socialists (RS), which opposed
the demand raised by workers for a “second revolution,” seeking instead
to legitimize the lie that the SCAF military command was the vehicle of
a “democratic transition.” In May of last year, the RS asserted that
the SCAF “aims to reform the political and economic system, allowing it
to become more democratic and less oppressive.”
Later, when
popular opposition to the SCAF mounted in response to mass arrests and
military trials of workers and youth, the RS promoted the Muslim
Brotherhood as an alternative to the generals, brushing aside the role
of the Brotherhood in collaborating with the military regime. They did
so in order to head off the development of an independent movement of
the working class.
In the second round of the presidential
election, the RS threw its support to the Brotherhood, claiming that a
vote for Morsi was a vote against “counterrevolution” and “fascism.”
In
an interview posted June 25 on socialistworker.org, the web site of the
RS’s American counterpart, the International Socialist Organization, RS
leader Mostafa Ali gives an indication of the illusions that his
organization is attempting to promote about the Brotherhood, which he
credits with stopping the military’s coup.
He poses a series of
questions: “Will the Muslim Brotherhood leadership once again compromise
with the SCAF? Will they betray the mass mobilization in the square?
Will they accept the terms of the deal that has been set by the SCAF?”
In
the interview, given on June 22, Ali suggests that the answer is no.
The Brotherhood, he states, despite its “wavering and vacillation,” has
“to draw a line in the sand in order to stop the coup.” Within two days,
this assessment proved completely bankrupt.
The task of the
“revolutionary left,” he continued, is to “build a united front of all
revolutionary forces against the coup,” in which he clearly includes the
Muslim Brotherhood and other bourgeois political forces. Within this
“united front,” he states, “the Egyptian working class would be a
significant part of a struggle that could combine both democratic
political demands and economic demands in weeks to come.”
Thus,
the aim of this so-called “left” party is to subordinate the working
class to the bourgeois Muslim Brotherhood, which has in turn agreed to
serve as a figurehead for the SCAF junta. This is a formula for binding
the Egyptian workers hand and foot and delivering them to their mortal
enemies.
The only way forward for the workers of Egypt lies in a
decisive rejection of this type of counterrevolutionary petty-bourgeois
politics. The unpostponable task is to organize a new revolutionary
leadership based on an international socialist perspective to mobilize
the independent strength of the working class in the struggle for power
and the overthrow of capitalist rule. This means building an Egyptian
section of the International Committee of the Fourth International. (WSWS)
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Media Release: Egypt
Celebrated by millions of Egyptians, yesterday’s announcement that Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, has won the presidential election undoubtedly marks a milestone in the country's history. Still, this event does little to resolve the fundamental problems that existed beforehand: eighteen months after the uprising that led to President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, the political system is paralysed, no institutions enjoy the required legitimacy or credibility to break the logjam, all political actors have been discredited to varying degrees, and societal polarisation has reached new heights. To salvage the transition and lay the foundation for a more stable polity, political actors need to do today what they ought to have done in February 2011: seek agreement on a set of principles that would respect all sides' vital interests while ensuring a peaceful democratic transition.
The deteriorating situation is the culmination of a mismanaged process that, from the very beginning, has lacked clear direction and agreed rules of the game. Political players -- including the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood and more liberal, secular forces -- are proceeding in the dark, unaccustomed to the new environment, distrustful of one another and quick to resort to extra-institutional means, whether issuance of arbitrary decisions or street politics, to bolster their respective positions.
The result is clear for all to see. With the recent SCAF measures -- restoring a form of martial law that allows the military to arrest civilians without judicial warrant; establishing a military-dominated National Defence Council; and promulgating a Supplementary Constitutional Declaration that enlarges its executive powers, awards it legislative authority and grants it considerable latitude over the drafting of a new constitution -- and the Supreme Constitutional Court's (SCC) invalidation of parliamentary elections, the transition risks coming full circle.
The outcome of the three rounds of voting, the first democratic ballots in modern Egyptian history, has been nullified or seriously questioned. The constitutional changes have in effect repealed the March 2011 constitutional referendum, both substantively and procedurally. The parliamentary dissolution has erased the legislative elections in which 30 million participated. And the presidential election was mired in controversy both before it was held (disputes over the disqualification of some candidates and qualification of others) and after (competing claims of victory, accompanied by charges of fraud and capped by delays in the announcement of the result). In this context, serious questions remain as to whether the promised transfer of power from the military to elected civilian authorities will occur by the end of June.
For now, the prospect remains of duelling constitutional principles with no constitution; duelling understandings of how to create the constituent assembly; duelling legislative bodies (the dissolved parliament and the SCAF); duelling conceptions of SCAF prerogatives (eg, whether it can dissolve parliament or issue constitutional rules); duelling perceptions of executive authority; duelling mass demonstrations setting one Egypt against the other; and no agreed mechanism or legitimate arbiter to settle these disputes. Divisions reach deeper, pitting army against civilians, Islamists against secularists and Muslims against Coptic Christians. Add an economic crisis (60 per cent decline in foreign currency reserves, massive budget deficit, soaring unemployment, stagflation, near junk-status credit rating) that cannot be tackled in the absence of political stability and consensus and this is a recipe for persisting conflict and a possible trigger to escalating violence.
The behaviour of the various parties to date hardly inspires confidence. Viewed by many as responsible for brutal violence against protesters, as seeking to protect its interests by reviving the old regime's networks and as claiming for itself the roles of judge and party, the SCAF has squandered much of its legitimacy. Yet, it continues to believe otherwise, attempting to muscle through critical political decisions by relying on superior force and invoking its assumed greater knowledge of what is best for the country. Little wonder that many in Egypt suspect it of conducting a soft coup.
For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood has appeared to place all its bets on its electoral strength, shunning serious efforts to reassure key constituencies. It has antagonised the military, turned its back on the revolutionary movement, failed to reach out to secular forces, made insufficient gestures toward the Coptic Christian minority, threatened supporters of the old regime and repeatedly reneged on its pledges. In recent days, it has taken some steps to extend a hand to others in the opposition but far more is needed after eighteen months of snubbing them. Overall, although it enjoys formal democratic legitimacy, the Brotherhood has rallied against itself too broad and too determined a section of society for electoral mathematics alone to be decisive.
As for the revolutionary movement, disdainful of politics yet facing overwhelming popular fatigue at the prospect of renewed protests, it is distrustful of the SCAF but fearful of the Islamists. This makes its members at times flirt with the idea of sacrificing their democratic principles on the altar of their secular faith -- thus turning them into easy prey for the military's divide-and-conquer tactics, which seek to set them against the Islamists so that the two faces of the opposition do not unite behind an expeditious transition. All of which threatens to marginalize the revolutionary movement and render it increasingly irrelevant.
There is little mystery about the better way forward. Key political actors need to negotiate a set of understandings governing the transition, including a clear timetable, allocation of interim powers, constitution-drafting principles and core interests that the final document must protect. Movement should be swift. Morsi is due to be sworn in on 1 July and, already, crises loom: over whether parliament will convene and whether the president will take his oath before parliament (consistent with the March 2011 constitutional amendments approved by referendum) or before the Supreme Constitutional Court (consistent with the SCAF's supplementary principles). Suggested ideas for these understandings include:
Throughout this process, the international community -- and notably the West -- has been caught between the need to support a democratic transition and the enormous suspicions that continue to taint its actions due to a chequered history of excessive interference and support for authoritarian rule. Achieving a proper balance between pressuring the SCAF without triggering widespread hostility will not be easy, especially at a time of heightened xenophobia and mistrust of anything coming from the outside.
At a minimum, the international community should express a strong commitment to helping the economy through what inevitably will be a trying period once it is clear the country is on a path to a genuine democratic transition. Assistance would include the International Monetary Fund's substantial soft loan package; financial aid from various countries; and encouragement of foreign direct investment. At the same time, key outside actors ought to unambiguously condemn attempts to undermine democratically-elected civilian institutions.
Considering the stakes, the historical rupture embodied in the uprising and the fears of so many core constituencies, what is most surprising, arguably, is that there has not been more violence -- that Egyptians, by and large, have engaged in spirited debate, taken to the streets peacefully and participated in electoral politics. Morsi's victory, though a bitter disappointment to a large number of Egyptians, is a signal of a continued transition. Yet all this is enormously fragile, a brittle reality at the mercy of a single significant misstep. To right the course of this perilous transition will require different and wiser steering from all who, for the past eighteen months, have had a hand in it. (ICG)
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Almost eighteen months after the downfall of Mubarak, America through
her loyal agents in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has
effectively scuttled the Egyptian revolution and disarmed the Muslim
brotherhood. By doing so, the US has successfully managed to keep the
regime intact minus a few missing faces. This is similar to the much
coveted Yemeni model, where the West was able to keep Salah's regime in
power without him. In the present Egyptian regime, the only outward
casualty of any prominence is Mubarak. Set against this background the
claims of a Morsi victory in the presidential elections by supporters of
the Muslim brotherhood not only sound increasingly hollow but are
extremely naïve indeed.
Over the past year or so, SCAF a vestige of the Nasserite period has adroitly hoodwinked the Egyptian people and tamed the divided opposition to retain absolute control over Egyptian affairs and continue with America's hegemony in the region. The nomination of Shafiq's candidature to the presidency, acquittal of Mubarak's sons, and the declaration by the Supreme Court to dissolve parliament are just some of the glaring measures enacted by the army generals to ensure that SCAF retains its grip on power. But perhaps the most daring of all political maneuvers instigated by SCAF was its decree to limit the powers of the President.
Such an act bestows full control to the army general over all civilian and legislative matters. In summary it is a carte blanche to write the country's constitutions in the army's image. SCAF is free to appoint assembly members to write the constitution, interfere in the drafting of the articles and veto any proposed canons that are deemed against the interests of the army generals.
SCAF could not have mustered the courage to take such a bold military coup against the Egyptian people if it was not for the antics of the Islamic opposition. The Islamic opposition never spoke with one voice and repeatedly contradicted itself by trying to please the West, the army, the Egyptian Muslims and the rest. The Islamic parties were unable to express unambiguous opinions on Egypt's relations with America and Israel, the role of Shariah in society, the system of ruling and the treatment of non-Muslims. In their quest to appease the West they forgot to fear Allah (SWT) and sought to assuage the apprehensions of His (SWT) creation. Allah says:
"Oh you who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared and die not except as Muslims." [Al-Imran: 102]
"Oh you who believe! Keep your duty to Allah and fear Him, and always speak the truth. He will direct you to do righteous deeds and will forgive you your sins. And whosoever obeys Allah and His Messenger, has indeed achieved a great achievement." [Al-Ahzaab: 70-71]
In their desire to appear more liberal to the West, the Islamic opposition lost the confidence of ordinary Egyptians, many of whom increasingly saw hypocrisy in their actions and began to turn away from them. Ordinary Muslims were not the only ones who were disappointed. The rank and file of these movements, especially the young, challenged the stance adopted by their leaders. They found it very difficult to digest Islam's domination by Taghoot. Allah says:
"Have you seen those who claim to believe in the revelation revealed to you and the revelation revealed earlier? They seek the ruling of taghoot (non-Islam) although they have been ordered to disbelieve in it." [TMQ An-Nisa: 60].
However, what made matters worse for the Islamic opposition was their blind adherence to the democratic election process while remaining silent on the actions of SCAF. Islamic parties in Egypt must understand that it is impossible to bring Islam through either participation or negotiations with the systems of Kufr. Our modern history is replete with examples where Islamic parties have failed miserably to bring about Islam through engagement with Kufr. The dismissal of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in 1991 and the exploitation of the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) by Musharraf in 2002 are two such striking examples.
The only way for Muslims of Egypt to escape from the tyranny of the West and the rule of their agents is through the re-establishment of the Islamic state. Islamic parties must join forces with Muslims of Egypt and collaborate with sincere officers in the Egyptian army to re-establish Khliafah Rashida by giving baya to the Khaleefah who will rule according to the Quran and Sunnah.
"Verily, Allah will help those who help His (cause)." [Al-Hajj: 40] (Islamic Revival)
3/
Media Release: Egypt
Celebrated by millions of Egyptians, yesterday’s announcement that Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, has won the presidential election undoubtedly marks a milestone in the country's history. Still, this event does little to resolve the fundamental problems that existed beforehand: eighteen months after the uprising that led to President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, the political system is paralysed, no institutions enjoy the required legitimacy or credibility to break the logjam, all political actors have been discredited to varying degrees, and societal polarisation has reached new heights. To salvage the transition and lay the foundation for a more stable polity, political actors need to do today what they ought to have done in February 2011: seek agreement on a set of principles that would respect all sides' vital interests while ensuring a peaceful democratic transition.
The deteriorating situation is the culmination of a mismanaged process that, from the very beginning, has lacked clear direction and agreed rules of the game. Political players -- including the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood and more liberal, secular forces -- are proceeding in the dark, unaccustomed to the new environment, distrustful of one another and quick to resort to extra-institutional means, whether issuance of arbitrary decisions or street politics, to bolster their respective positions.
The result is clear for all to see. With the recent SCAF measures -- restoring a form of martial law that allows the military to arrest civilians without judicial warrant; establishing a military-dominated National Defence Council; and promulgating a Supplementary Constitutional Declaration that enlarges its executive powers, awards it legislative authority and grants it considerable latitude over the drafting of a new constitution -- and the Supreme Constitutional Court's (SCC) invalidation of parliamentary elections, the transition risks coming full circle.
The outcome of the three rounds of voting, the first democratic ballots in modern Egyptian history, has been nullified or seriously questioned. The constitutional changes have in effect repealed the March 2011 constitutional referendum, both substantively and procedurally. The parliamentary dissolution has erased the legislative elections in which 30 million participated. And the presidential election was mired in controversy both before it was held (disputes over the disqualification of some candidates and qualification of others) and after (competing claims of victory, accompanied by charges of fraud and capped by delays in the announcement of the result). In this context, serious questions remain as to whether the promised transfer of power from the military to elected civilian authorities will occur by the end of June.
For now, the prospect remains of duelling constitutional principles with no constitution; duelling understandings of how to create the constituent assembly; duelling legislative bodies (the dissolved parliament and the SCAF); duelling conceptions of SCAF prerogatives (eg, whether it can dissolve parliament or issue constitutional rules); duelling perceptions of executive authority; duelling mass demonstrations setting one Egypt against the other; and no agreed mechanism or legitimate arbiter to settle these disputes. Divisions reach deeper, pitting army against civilians, Islamists against secularists and Muslims against Coptic Christians. Add an economic crisis (60 per cent decline in foreign currency reserves, massive budget deficit, soaring unemployment, stagflation, near junk-status credit rating) that cannot be tackled in the absence of political stability and consensus and this is a recipe for persisting conflict and a possible trigger to escalating violence.
The behaviour of the various parties to date hardly inspires confidence. Viewed by many as responsible for brutal violence against protesters, as seeking to protect its interests by reviving the old regime's networks and as claiming for itself the roles of judge and party, the SCAF has squandered much of its legitimacy. Yet, it continues to believe otherwise, attempting to muscle through critical political decisions by relying on superior force and invoking its assumed greater knowledge of what is best for the country. Little wonder that many in Egypt suspect it of conducting a soft coup.
For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood has appeared to place all its bets on its electoral strength, shunning serious efforts to reassure key constituencies. It has antagonised the military, turned its back on the revolutionary movement, failed to reach out to secular forces, made insufficient gestures toward the Coptic Christian minority, threatened supporters of the old regime and repeatedly reneged on its pledges. In recent days, it has taken some steps to extend a hand to others in the opposition but far more is needed after eighteen months of snubbing them. Overall, although it enjoys formal democratic legitimacy, the Brotherhood has rallied against itself too broad and too determined a section of society for electoral mathematics alone to be decisive.
As for the revolutionary movement, disdainful of politics yet facing overwhelming popular fatigue at the prospect of renewed protests, it is distrustful of the SCAF but fearful of the Islamists. This makes its members at times flirt with the idea of sacrificing their democratic principles on the altar of their secular faith -- thus turning them into easy prey for the military's divide-and-conquer tactics, which seek to set them against the Islamists so that the two faces of the opposition do not unite behind an expeditious transition. All of which threatens to marginalize the revolutionary movement and render it increasingly irrelevant.
There is little mystery about the better way forward. Key political actors need to negotiate a set of understandings governing the transition, including a clear timetable, allocation of interim powers, constitution-drafting principles and core interests that the final document must protect. Movement should be swift. Morsi is due to be sworn in on 1 July and, already, crises loom: over whether parliament will convene and whether the president will take his oath before parliament (consistent with the March 2011 constitutional amendments approved by referendum) or before the Supreme Constitutional Court (consistent with the SCAF's supplementary principles). Suggested ideas for these understandings include:
- Formation by president-elect Morsi of a national unity government, led by a credible independent figure, and selection of a vice president reflecting Egypt’s ideological and sectarian diversity;
- the SCAF's agreement not to dissolve the existing constituent assembly and name another; in return, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists would form a more broadly representative body, substituting respected independents and legal experts for some Islamists;
- agreement to rerun the one third of parliamentary seats elected via individual candidacies that the SCC ruled unconstitutional, as opposed to dissolving the entire parliament;
- cancellation of the justice ministry decree enabling the military to arrest and detain civilians without a warrant;
- annulment of those provisions in the supplementary constitutional declaration that contradict full transfer of power to civilians and would usurp powers of the president and legislature;
- the SCAF's commitment to fully disengage from the political arena once the constitution has been written and ratified through a popular referendum; and
- the Muslim Brotherhood's agreement to seek its legalisation and make its finances fully transparent.
Throughout this process, the international community -- and notably the West -- has been caught between the need to support a democratic transition and the enormous suspicions that continue to taint its actions due to a chequered history of excessive interference and support for authoritarian rule. Achieving a proper balance between pressuring the SCAF without triggering widespread hostility will not be easy, especially at a time of heightened xenophobia and mistrust of anything coming from the outside.
At a minimum, the international community should express a strong commitment to helping the economy through what inevitably will be a trying period once it is clear the country is on a path to a genuine democratic transition. Assistance would include the International Monetary Fund's substantial soft loan package; financial aid from various countries; and encouragement of foreign direct investment. At the same time, key outside actors ought to unambiguously condemn attempts to undermine democratically-elected civilian institutions.
Considering the stakes, the historical rupture embodied in the uprising and the fears of so many core constituencies, what is most surprising, arguably, is that there has not been more violence -- that Egyptians, by and large, have engaged in spirited debate, taken to the streets peacefully and participated in electoral politics. Morsi's victory, though a bitter disappointment to a large number of Egyptians, is a signal of a continued transition. Yet all this is enormously fragile, a brittle reality at the mercy of a single significant misstep. To right the course of this perilous transition will require different and wiser steering from all who, for the past eighteen months, have had a hand in it. (ICG)
4/
Egypt's farcical presidential election makes a mockery of the sacrifices of the revolution and strengthens America's control over Egypt!
Over the past year or so, SCAF a vestige of the Nasserite period has adroitly hoodwinked the Egyptian people and tamed the divided opposition to retain absolute control over Egyptian affairs and continue with America's hegemony in the region. The nomination of Shafiq's candidature to the presidency, acquittal of Mubarak's sons, and the declaration by the Supreme Court to dissolve parliament are just some of the glaring measures enacted by the army generals to ensure that SCAF retains its grip on power. But perhaps the most daring of all political maneuvers instigated by SCAF was its decree to limit the powers of the President.
Such an act bestows full control to the army general over all civilian and legislative matters. In summary it is a carte blanche to write the country's constitutions in the army's image. SCAF is free to appoint assembly members to write the constitution, interfere in the drafting of the articles and veto any proposed canons that are deemed against the interests of the army generals.
SCAF could not have mustered the courage to take such a bold military coup against the Egyptian people if it was not for the antics of the Islamic opposition. The Islamic opposition never spoke with one voice and repeatedly contradicted itself by trying to please the West, the army, the Egyptian Muslims and the rest. The Islamic parties were unable to express unambiguous opinions on Egypt's relations with America and Israel, the role of Shariah in society, the system of ruling and the treatment of non-Muslims. In their quest to appease the West they forgot to fear Allah (SWT) and sought to assuage the apprehensions of His (SWT) creation. Allah says:
"Oh you who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared and die not except as Muslims." [Al-Imran: 102]
"Oh you who believe! Keep your duty to Allah and fear Him, and always speak the truth. He will direct you to do righteous deeds and will forgive you your sins. And whosoever obeys Allah and His Messenger, has indeed achieved a great achievement." [Al-Ahzaab: 70-71]
In their desire to appear more liberal to the West, the Islamic opposition lost the confidence of ordinary Egyptians, many of whom increasingly saw hypocrisy in their actions and began to turn away from them. Ordinary Muslims were not the only ones who were disappointed. The rank and file of these movements, especially the young, challenged the stance adopted by their leaders. They found it very difficult to digest Islam's domination by Taghoot. Allah says:
"Have you seen those who claim to believe in the revelation revealed to you and the revelation revealed earlier? They seek the ruling of taghoot (non-Islam) although they have been ordered to disbelieve in it." [TMQ An-Nisa: 60].
However, what made matters worse for the Islamic opposition was their blind adherence to the democratic election process while remaining silent on the actions of SCAF. Islamic parties in Egypt must understand that it is impossible to bring Islam through either participation or negotiations with the systems of Kufr. Our modern history is replete with examples where Islamic parties have failed miserably to bring about Islam through engagement with Kufr. The dismissal of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in 1991 and the exploitation of the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) by Musharraf in 2002 are two such striking examples.
The only way for Muslims of Egypt to escape from the tyranny of the West and the rule of their agents is through the re-establishment of the Islamic state. Islamic parties must join forces with Muslims of Egypt and collaborate with sincere officers in the Egyptian army to re-establish Khliafah Rashida by giving baya to the Khaleefah who will rule according to the Quran and Sunnah.
"Verily, Allah will help those who help His (cause)." [Al-Hajj: 40] (Islamic Revival)
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